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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
JOSEPH R. FREDRICKSON ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No. 20070432-SC 
Dist. Court No. 061100198 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury trial to two counts of 
Possession with Intent to Manufacture a Controlled Substance, a first degree 
felony; two counts of Endangerment, a third degree felony; and one count of 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. Jurisdiction for the 
Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-
2(3)(i). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT 1 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
1 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
MAKE A MOTION TO DISMISS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which 
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law 
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we 
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
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conviction." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
reverse the Defendant's conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 972 P.2d at 
651 (citations and quotations omitted). Since Defendant's attorney didn't 
move for a directed verdict it should be reviewed under a plain error standard 
of review. "[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate 
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant 
must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. 
.." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8(l)(a)(i). Prohibited acts -- Penalties, 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
§76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
§58-37A-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§78-2-2(3)(i). Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: (i) the Public Service Commission. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
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indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in the First District Court of Box Elder 
County with two counts of Possession with Intent to Manufacture a Controlled 
Substance, a first degree felony; two counts of Endangerment, a third degree 
felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A Misdemeanor. A jury 
trial was held in front of the Honorable J. Ben Hadfield on March 21, 2007. 
The Jury found the Defendant guilty of the charges. The Defendant was 
sentenced to two terms of five years, which may be for life in the Utah State 
Prison; two terms of 0-5 year's prison; and 365 days in jail. The sentences were 
stayed, the Defendant was put on probation and ordered to complete 365 days 
in jail as part of his probation. The judgment and order on commitment was 
entered on May 8, 2007. The Defendant is currently serving the jail time. A 
notice of appeal was timely filed on May 18, 2007 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State called John Losee, Jeremy Rose, Troy Pilivi, Dave Murphy 
and Doug Spencer to testify regarding the events that occurred on or about 
May 25, 2006. Mr. Losee, the Defendant's landlord, testified that on May 25th, 
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he was performing maintenance on swamp coolers on top of the Defendant's 
apartment when he noticed lights hanging from the ceiling and marijuana 
plants growing in the north bedroom. (R. 144/74). Mr. Losee then left to pick 
up parts for the swamp cooler, went to the police station and spoke with 
Officer Rose about what he observed. (R. 144/76-77). Later that day, Mr. 
Losee put his ladder back in place and noticed a blanket covering the window 
so he could no longer see inside. (R. 144/77). The Defendant came and spoke 
to Mr. Losee and told him that he was growing tomato plants and talked about 
rent. (R. 144/77). Mr. Losee told the Defendant to pay rent or get out of the 
apartment. (R. 144/78). Mr. Losee had tried multiple times to evict Defendant, 
and Defendant told Mr. Losee that he would vacate the apartment by the end of 
June. (R. 144/89) After Mr. Losee spoke with Officer Rose, Officer Rose 
obtained a search warrant for the Defendant's residence (R. 144/114) and asked 
Mr. Losee for a key. (R. 144/116) Mr. Losee brought the officer a key as well 
as a map of the apartment indicating where the marijuana grow was located 
within the apartment. (R. 144/115, 118) Mr. Losee was told that a warrant was 
going to be served and to keep an eye on the activity at the apartment. (R. 
1/116) On the day the search warrant was issued, Officer Murphy and Mr. 
Losee informed Officer Rose that the Fredrickson family had left the premise 
in a black car. (R. 144/117) Officer Rose and his team left the staging area in 
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Tremonton, drove to the Defendant's residence, entered the apartment (R. 
144/118) and collected evidence of various plants, pots, lights, blankets, drug 
paraphernalia, and magazines. (R. 144/124-136) Upon entering the residence a 
strong smell of fresh marijuana was detectable throughout the apartment 
including the children's bedroom. (R. 144/174)(R. 145/31) 
The Defendant and his wife were located in Defendant's car and were 
arrested. (R. 144/117) The Defendant's children were taken into custody by 
Child and Family Services, and the investigator for Child and Family Services 
testified that the children and their clothes smelled like the home. (R. 145 2/32) 
Detective Spencer was asked to send two samples of what appeared to be 
mushrooms down to the crime lab, and the tests came back negative for 
psilocybin mushrooms. (R. 144/184, 187) Detective Spencer then sent down a 
third sample of a mushroom located at the bottom of a food dehydrator and the 
test result was positive for psilocybin. (Rl44/188) This test, however, was on 
an extremely small sample of less than one tenth of a gram. On cross-
examination Bo Smith, the forensic scientist, admitted that the sample was so 
small that it could be airborne if there was a breeze and the flakes were small 
enough. (R. 145/24) Detective Spencer tested the plant obtained in the 
apartment and concluded a positive result of marijuana. (R. 144/197) 
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The Defense had witnesses testify that on two previous occasions Mr. 
Losee had entered the Defendant's home without permission. (R. 145/85, 109) 
Additionally, prior to the officers entering the residence, no guest had ever 
mentioned a strong smell within the house or on the Defendant's children; and 
all recalled the room in which the evidence was found had been the 
Defendant's daughter's playroom. (R. 145/73, 86) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant raises two points on appeal. First, his trial counsel was 
ineffective when he failed to make a motion to dismiss the case at the 
conclusion of the State's case. Second, the trial court committed plain error 
when it didn't dismiss the case due to insufficiency of the evidence. 
The evidence against the Defendant was insufficient. A marijuana grow 
was found in his apartment. There were no witnesses to who placed the illegal 
plants and paraphernalia in the apartment. The Defendant was seen leaving his 
apartment prior to the time the search warrant was issued and illegal substances 
found. The Defendant was arrested from his vehicle and was never able to go 
back to his residence. 
The crime lab determined that the substances found were marijuana and 
illegal mushrooms; however, no evidence was established at trial that showed 
the Defendant was the one responsible for placing the items in the room or that 
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the items belonged to him. The Defendant's trial attorney failed to make a 
motion to dismiss at the end of the State's evidence. For these reasons, the 
Defendant asks this Court to find that his trial counsel was ineffective and that 
the trial court committed plain error for failing to dismiss the case at the 
conclusion of the State's evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
MAKE A MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE 
STATE'S EVIDENCE. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, 
the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693. 
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In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 
688. Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the 
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance", Id. at 688, it did mention certain minimal requirements. These 
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well 
as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the 
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the 
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688. 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrison, Ml U.S. 365 (1986), the Court 
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct 
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to 
be deficient. The Court stated: 
11 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, 
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim 
is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence 
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to 
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct 
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only 
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while 
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for 
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under 
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance 
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional 
assistance in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrison, All 
U.S. 365,386(1986). 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court 
reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel 
theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State 
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failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon 
permit during its case in chief." 
In the present case, defense counsel failed to make a motion to dismiss 
after the State rested. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make 
a motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure, 
and this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the definition of Strickland and its Federal and State progeny. The general 
practice of defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a directed verdict or 
motion to dismiss after the state has rested. This is especially true when the 
state has failed to strongly establish one or more of the elements of the charge. 
In State v. Maestas 1999 UT 32 \ 32, 984 P.2d 376, the Supreme Court 
of Utah was presented with a case where trial counsel failed to present any 
evidence on eyewitness identification and failed to even ask for a cautionary 
jury instruction on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In that case the 
Court held: 
[T]rial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to 
request a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction that would 
have informed the jury of the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. 
The record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would ameliorate 
or explain that deficiency. 
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Further, in State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)1 the Utah 
Court of Appeals held, "[w]e conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this 
lack of evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is 'so deficient as to fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness."' (Citations omitted) In the 
present case there is simply no reason for trial counsel not to move the court 
for a directed verdict when the evidence against the Defendant was insufficient. 
This failure clearly fulfills the first prong of the Strickland test 
The second prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. In the case at bar, the 
evidence against the Defendant was insufficient. A marijuana grow was found 
in his apartment. The state crime lab determined that items found were illegal 
substances. There were no witnesses who saw the Defendant in the room with 
the marijuana grow, within the possession of illegal paraphernalia, or setting-
up the grow room. The Defendant was seen in the morning leaving his 
apartment prior to the discovery of the marijuana grow and was arrested after 
the discovery and awray from the residence. There was evidence that the 
Defendant's landlord had entered his apartment without permission on 
previous occasions, (R. 145/85, 109) and there was evidence that the room in 
1
 Reversed on other grounds in State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 615. 
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which the marijuana grow was found was the Defendant's children's playroom. 
(R. 145/73) 
Based on the insufficient evidence, Defendant's counsel should have 
moved the court to dismiss the case. Under Rule 17(p) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the trial court "may issue an order dismissing any 
information ... upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense." Defense 
counsel did not raise that possibility for the trial court to decide. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION. 
In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme 
Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's 
performance falls below a reasonable standard. This Court further stated "[i]t 
necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the case to the 
jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of the 
evidence is apparent to the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
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The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in 
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's 
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence 
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000). This Utah Supreme 
Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 
(Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 
981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[ojrdinarily, a reviewing court may not 
reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction 
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid 
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
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purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
defendant's guilty verdict. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the 
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case 
where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed 
evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the 
defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with 
the victim and the fact that he had related a dream to three individuals in which 
he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he 
might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that 
the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost 
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 
2002), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined 
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. 
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was 
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found, but rather the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had 
the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had 
the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if 
indeed it ever existed. Id. at 100. 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an 
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is 
undisputed that there were no witnesses who could identify Defendant as the 
person who set-up this marijuana grow. The State failed to prove how the 
marijuana grow was set up and who actually did set it up. The evidence was 
only speculative that it was the Defendant who was responsible for the 
marijuana grow. The evidence on the psilosin mushrooms was even weaker. 
Not only did the state fail to establish that it was the defendant who produced 
any psilosin mushrooms but there was a question as to whether or not there was 
even any psilosin mushrooms seized at the scene. Although the forensic 
scientist preformed several tests on several samples sent by the state, all those 
tests came out negative with the exception of the third test on a extremely small 
sample (less than 1/10 of a gram) and it was admitted the that sample could 
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have been obtained a result of an airborne deposit which would further raise 
doubts as to the involvement of this Defendant in possession or production of 
psilosin mushrooms. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the marijuana grow was found in the Defendant's apartment, 
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was 
responsible for growing the marijuana and setting up the marijuana grow in the 
child's playroom. Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds should 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime he 
was convicted of. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of August 
)ALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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Stephen R, Hadfield, 5707 
Box Elder County Attorney 
9 West Forest, Suite 310 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 723-0785 
N THE FIRST JUDiClAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE fc>F UTA^ S 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH RICHARD FREDRICKSON , 
Defendant. 
JUDGEWENTIAMD ORDER ON 
COMMITMENT TO PRISON 
Court Case; #: 061100198 
(Agency Cade #: 06-SF0138) 
<!)udge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regulafjly for sentencing on May 8, 
2007. before the Honorable Ben H, Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally 
together with his counsel of record, Jonathan R. Grovef, Esq. The State was 
represented by Brandon J, Maynard of the Box Elder Qounty Attorney's Office, 
It was the judgment of the Court that the Defendant was convicted of the 
following crime(s): 
1: PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE! (DFZ), \r\ violation of Utah Code 
Ana § 58^37-6(1 )(a)(4 
a first degree felony, 
2: PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCB (DFZ), in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a)(ij, 
a second degree felonf/. 
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3: CLANDESTINE LABORATORY ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR ELDER ADULT, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-112.5, 
a third degree felony. 
A' CLANDESTINE LABORATORY ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR ELDER ADULT, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.p, 
a third degree felony. 
5; POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (DFZ), in violalLion of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-378-5(1), 
a class A misdemeanor, 
based upon the findings of the jury. 
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, the Court hereby sentences the 
Defendant to a term of incarceration of 5 years to life on Count 1|, 1 to 15 years on 
Count 2, and 0 to 5 years on Counts 3 and 4 in the Utah State Pinson and one year in 
the Box Elder County Jail on Count 5. Said terms to run as follows: Counts 1 and 2 will 
run consecutively with each other and concurrently with the other counts and be served 
at the Utah State Prison. Execution of the prison sentence is hereby stayed and the 
Defendant is placed on forma) probation for a term of 36 months on the following terms 
and conditions: 
1. Serve up to one year in the Box Eider County Jgil with release after 9 months to 
NUCCC, 
2. Enter and successfully complete NUCCC if accepted. 
3. Pay a fine and surcharge of $1,850,00 with credit for out pf pocket costs of 
counseling. 
4. Pay a $25.00 court security fee, 
5. Complete monthly case action plan and review with probation officer each and 
every month. 
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6 Enter and successfully complete substance abuse treatment to include IOP. 
7 Complete Life Skills. 
8, Complete Master Recovery Plan within 14 days of being pjlaced on probation. 
9, Not possess or use alcohol or drugs, 
10, Submit to random chemical testing. 
11, Not frequent alcohol/drug places. 
12, Have no contact with alcohol/drug users. 
13 Submit to search and seizure. 
14. Maintain employment and/or schooling, 
15. Carry a probation identification card. 
16. Submit to DNA testing as directed by probation officer. 
±7Jiave no contact with William or Ashley Fredrickson3 unless approved by 
probation agent and the court. 
18. Abide by a curfew and electronic monitoring at the discretion of probation officer. 
19. Attend 12 community support groups within the first 90 dgys of probation-after 
release from custody. 
20. Write a letter of apology to the court, County Attorney's Uffice, and officers 
involved, and John Losee, 
21. Report to AP&P within 48 hours of sentencing or release' from custody, 
DATED this 2^ day of /vt<ty , 2007, 
Ben H. Hadfield, Judge , 
' First Judicial District Court 
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